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Abstract
This paper addresses the establishment of secure communication links between smart-meters (Alice)
and an aggregator (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). The proposed scenario assumes:
(i) MIMOME wiretap channel; (ii) transmit antenna selection at the Alice; (iii) no channel state
information at the transmitter; (iv) fixed Wyner codes; and (v) guarantee of secure throughput by both
quality of service and secrecy outage constraints. We propose a simple protocol to enhance security via
transmit antenna selection, and then assess its performance in closed-form by means of secrecy outage
and successful transmission probabilities. We assume these probabilities are our constraints and then
maximize the secure throughput, establishing a security-reliability trade-off for the proposed scenario.
Our numerical results illustrate the effect of this trade-off on the secure throughput as well as on the
number of antennas at Alice, Bob and Eve. Interestingly, a small sacrifice in reliability allows secrecy
enhancement in terms of secure bps/Hz. We apply this idea in our smart grid application to exemplify
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2that, although Eve may acquire some samples of the average power demand of a household, it is not
enough to properly reconstruct such curve.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have become an indispensable part of our daily life through several ap-
plications that allows us to remotely monitor and control different processes within our homes,
workplaces or even modern power grids. In this context, each application has its own set of
requirements and performance targets, which should be considered whenever designing com-
munication systems. For instance, smart meters sending information about energy consumption
have looser reliability and latency requirements than grid control applications in the high-voltage
lines [1], [2].
One downside of wireless systems relates to information security and secrecy as they more
susceptible to eavesdropping and denial of service attacks (e.g. jamming and spoofing) than
wired systems due to its own nature [3]–[5]. To cope with such issue, current security systems
are mainly based on cryptographic methods employed at the upper layers of communication
protocols, while assuming limited computational power at the eavesdropper [4], [5].
This assumption, nonetheless, is becoming an issue nowadays since the computational power
of devices are steadily growing. Another weak point is that cryptographic solutions often overlook
the physical properties of the wireless medium, the relative locations of the network elements
and the actual transmitted information [4], [5].
Information-theoretic security at the physical layer has reemerged to cope with such issues and
complement cryptography by adding reliability and confidentiality at lower layers [5]. Physical
layer (PHY) security can also open new ways to enhance robustness and reduce the complexity of
conventional cryptography as far as it is built to be unbreakable and quantifiable (in confidential
bps/Hz), regardless of the eavesdropper’s computational power [5]. The notion of PHY-security
was first introduced by Shannon in his seminal work in 1949 [6]. But it was only later, in 1975,
3that Wyner proposed in [7] the wiretap channel where the eavesdropper attempts to decode
the information based on a degraded version of the legitimate link signal. Later in [8], authors
showed the existence of a transmission rate that guarantees confidentiality based only on the
statistics of the wireless channel.
In 2008, after a long period, those initial results are extended to account for the effects of
fading channels [9], [10]. Thereafter, different established techniques in wireless systems have
been analyzed, for instance multiple antenna wiretap channel is characterized in [11], cooperative
diversity is investigated in [12]–[14], while multi antenna diversity schemes are analyzed in
[15]–[17]. Notwithstanding all these fundamental results and advances, most works have quite
restrictive assumptions on the eavesdropper, for instance, it is common to assume some (or even
full) knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper [5], which turns out to
be not feasible in practice since the legitimate transmitter may not be aware of the eavesdroppers.
Alternatively, few works consider the case where no CSI is available at the transmitters [14],
[18], [19]; however perfect secrecy cannot be achieved at all times and then secrecy outage
characterization is performed in order to capture the probability of having a reliable and secure
transmission.
Consequently, PHY-security is neglected as a suitable option, even when the application
in consideration presents the characteristics that would make such an approach viable. Some
applications of the smart energy grid are good examples where PHY-security appears as an
attractive solution to enhance security and confidentiality [20]. PHY-security enables an en-
hanced secure communication network (i) within smart-homes, (ii) between smart-meters and
aggregators, and (iii) between aggregators and the local (cloud-)controller; and these three levels
of communications are in fact the information backbone of the modern electricity distribution
grid [1]–[4]. Besides [4], which summarizes the wireless network architecture in smart grid and
proposes a key establishment protocol, few works consider PHY-security in this context.
In this work we attempt to fill this gap and focus on the secure communication between smart
meters and aggregators in the presence of an eavesdropper (known as Eve). We assume that the
smart meter poses as a legitimate transmitter (also known as Alice), while the aggregator acts
as the legitimate receiver (known as Bob). Both receivers (Bob and Eve) are able to estimate
4their own CSI, but Alice does not possess any CSI and resorts to adaptive encoder with constant
transmit rate (which can be optimally chosen). We build upon [15], [16], which introduces a
scheme that allows only Bob to exploit diversity from Alice’s transmission and thus limiting
Eve’s attack by design; therefore, we assume that all nodes have multiple antennas, but Alice
employs transmit antenna selection (TAS) while Bob and Eve employ maximal ratio combining
(MRC). Then, we characterize the secrecy outage and secure throughput. Finally, we put our
results in the context of smart grids, and thus resort to actual measured data and evaluate the
impact of outages in the reconstruction of the average power demand by the aggregator.
Our results show that the proposed scheme achieves high reliability while restricting Eve
capabilities by design and therefore enhancing security. Our main contributions are summarized
next:
‚ we extend the results in [16], [19] by (i) assuming multi antenna wire-tap channel (all nodes
have multiple antennas), (ii) characterizing in closed-form the secrecy outage probability
for the case without CSI at the transmitter; (iii) provide a secure throughput analysis;
‚ we analyze the trade-off between security and reliability by introducing a parameter that
reflects the quality of service of the legitimate link;
‚ we propose a secure throughput maximization problem, and we evaluate the respective
system performance with respect to the network configuration parameters;
‚ we investigate how the trade-off between secrecy and reliability affects performance in
terms of secure throughput;
‚ we apply our results to smart grids, resorting to actual data to support and exemplify our
findings; we show that even if Eve acquires some information, it will not be enough to
reconstruct the power demand curve of a household.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the system model and our
main assumptions, Section III presents the secure outage probability analysis focusing on the
optimization problem, and illustrates how the system performance changes with respect to the
configuration parameters. Then, Section IV addresses the secure reconstruction of the average
power demand curve as a function of the outage events, while Section V discuss how our results
might be used in actual deployments. Section VI draws the final remarks and concludes this
5paper.
Notation: Hereafter we denote scalar variables by italic symbols, while vectors and matrices are
denoted by lower-case and upper-case boldface symbols, respectively. Given a complex vector x,
||x|| denotes the Euclidean norm, then pxqT and pxq: denote transpose and conjugate transpose
operations, respectively. The m ˆ m identity matrix is represented as Im. Probability density
function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a given random variable X are
denoted as fXpxq and FXpxq, respectively, while its expectation is denoted as E r¨s. Gamma
function is defined as Γpzq [21, Ch 6, §6.1.1], and the regularized lower incomplete gamma
function is denoted as P ps, zq “ γps,zq
Γpzq [21, Ch 6, §6.5.1].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume multiple antenna wiretap channel where a legitimate pair attempts to communicate
securely in the presence of an eavesdropper. The transmitter is known as Alice and represents
a smart meter and possesses NA antennas, while the NB antenna receiver is known as Bob and
plays as an aggregator (responsible for acquiring information from smart meters and performing
control and management actions [22]). The untrusted node, commonly named as Eve, is assumed
to have NE antennas. Eve may eavesdrop and attempt to acquire data from Alice’s transmissions.
Herein, we assume that Alice sends its average power demand to the aggregator, which by its
turn reconstructs this signal in order to perform control and power demand management of its
grid.
This scenario is depicted in Fig. 1, where the solid black line represents the communication
between Alice and Bob, while eavesdropper link is depicted in as a dashed red arrow. Moreover,
both receivers are able to estimate their own CSI, but no CSI is fed back to Alice. However, there
is a open and error-free feedback channel between Bob and Alice which is used to convey the
index of Alice’s antenna with the best signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) and enable on-off transmission.
As in [14], [16], such channel is open and error-free, and even if Eve acquires this feedback
and knows the antenna index an optimum TAS scheme with respect to Bob is a random TAS
scheme concerning Eve. Therefore, Eve is not able to exploit diversity from Alice’s multiple
antennas since legitimate and eavesdropper channels are uncorrelated. Another advantage of this
6approach is that the feedback channel can have limited capacity, and the number of bits necessary
for this channel is nbits “ rlog2NAs.
A. Transmission protocol and encoding scheme
The aggregator schedules and requests each smart meter to send its average power demand.
Such a request is performed though the feedback channel, which not only carries the signaling
to start the transmission but also the antenna index. Since no CSI is fed back to Alice, we resort
to fixed Wyner codes, with constant transmission rate, which can be optimally chosen given the
network configuration parameters as we shall see in the next section.
Let us first define the capacity of the legitimate and eavesdropper links as Cb and Ce,
respectively. Then, Bob chooses two rates: a transmission rate Rb and a confidential rate Rs, and
we define the cost of securing a transmission as Re “ Rb´Rs [18], [19]. Then, two conditions
arise in order to guarantee secrecy and reliability: (i) whenever Cb ą Rb the message is correctly
Alice Bob
Eve
... ...
...
hAB
hAE
Fig. 1. Network deployment illustration: Alice employs TAS, while Bob and Eve resort to MRC, but only Bob is able to
exploit diversity from Alice’s antennas. An error-free open channel is assumed between Bob and Alice, so that Bob can enable
the Alice’s transmission and inform the best antenna index.
7decoded at Bob; and (ii) an information leakage occurs whenever Ce ą Re [18], [19]. These
conditions guarantee that there is a Wyner code that ensures a reliable (small error probabilities)
and secure communication link. Further details of fixed Wyner codes and code construction can
be found in [18]. Furthermore, in this context we adopt a probabilistic measure of security,
namely secrecy outage probability, and then we are able to characterize the secure throughput
maximization problem analyzed in Section III.
B. Legitimate and Eavesdropper Channel models
We assume that all channels coefficients are independent and the squared-envelope is exponen-
tially distributed, thus we consider Rayleigh fading. In the legitimate channel, a single transmit
antenna is selected at Alice to maximize the SNR at Bob, which applies MRC at the received
signal. The best antenna index is defined as i˚:
i˚ “ argmax
1ď i ďNA
||hiB||, (1)
where hiB “ rhi1, hi2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , hiNB sT denotes the NB ˆ 1 channel vector between the ith transmit
antenna at Alice and the NB antennas at Bob with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
Rayleigh fading.
Then, Alice encodes the message with the codeword x “ rxp1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xpiq, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xpnqqs, using the
aforementioned Wyner codes [18]. We also assume that the codeword transmitted is subject to
an average power constraint 1
n
řn
i“1 E r|xpiq|2s ď PA, where PA denotes Alice’s transmit power.
Then, Bob combines the signal vectors using MRC, which yields the following received signal
at time i:
yBpiq “ h:ABhABxpiq ` h:ABnAB, (2)
where hAB “ hi˚B represents the legitimate channel vector, nAB is the NB ˆ 1 additive white
Gaussian noise vector at Bob, assuming E
”
nABn
:
AB
ı
“ INBσ2AB, with σ2AB being the noise
variance at each antenna. Thus, from (2) the instantaneous SNR of the legitimate link is
γB “ ||hAB||
2PA
σ2AB
, (3)
8and its PDF and CDF are defined, respectively, as [23]
fγBpγq “
NA γ
NB´1
ΓpNBq γNBB
exp
ˆ
´ γ
γB
˙
P
ˆ
NB ,
γ
γB
˙NA´1
, (4)
FγBpγq “ P
ˆ
NB ,
γ
γB
˙NA
, (5)
where γB denotes the average SNR and we recall that P p¨, ¨q denotes the regularized lower
incomplete gamma function [21, Ch 6, §6.5.1] Notice from (4) and (5) that the legitimate channel
exploits diversity from Alice and Bob’s multiple antennas.
On the other hand, Eve perceives a random TAS scheme, thus can only exploit diversity from
its own antennas. Therefore, Eve combines the eavesdropped signal vectors using MRC, which
yields the following received signal at time i
yEpiq “ h:AEhAExpiq ` h:AEnAE, (6)
where hAE “ hi˚B represents the eavesdropper channel vector, nAE is the NE ˆ 1 additive
white Gaussian noise vector at Eve, assuming E
”
nAEn
:
AE
ı
“ INEσ2AE , with σ2AE being the
noise variance at each antenna. Similarly to the legitimate link, all channels undergo Rayleigh
fading. In this context, we write the instantaneous SNR at Eve as γE “ ||hAE ||2PAσ2AE , which follows
Gamma distribution, and its PDF and CDF are given receptively as [16]
fγEpγq “
γNE´1
ΓpNEq γNEE
exp
ˆ
´ γ
γE
˙
, (7)
FγEpγq “ P
ˆ
NE ,
γ
γE
˙
, (8)
where γE denotes the average SNR at Eve.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE AND SECURE THROUGHPUT
As discussed above there are two conditions so as to guarantee secrecy and reliability [18],
[19]. With respect to the former, the channel capacity has to be greater than the transmission rate,
thus Cb ą Rb which ensures that the message is decoded. Therefore, we define the probability
of successful transmission for the proposed scheme in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The probability of successful transmission for the system model of Section II assuming
that an on-off transmission scheme, which occurs whenever γB exceeds an SNR threshold µ, is
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Fig. 2. Example of the success and secrecy outage probabilities vs. the transmission rate Rb: aq distinct antenna arrangements
at the legitimate link with γB “ 10 dB; bq secrecy outage for different number of antennas and for two secure rates Rs P
t1, 3u bits{s{Hz with γE “ 0 dB
psuc “ Pr rCb ą Rbs “ Pr rγB ą µs “ 1´FγBpµq, where FγBp¨q is given in (5) and µ ě 2Rb´1,
which reflects the minimum value that guarantees reliability at the legitimate link.
On the other hand, regarding security, an information leakage occurs whenever Ce ą Re,
where Re “ Rb ´Rs, and thus we have secrecy outage which can be defined as follows.
Lemma 2. Given the system model of Section II and fixed Wyner codes, the probability of
secrecy outage is pso “ Pr rCe ą Rb ´Rss “ Pr
“
γE ą 2Rb´Rs ´ 1
‰ “ 1 ´ FγEp2Rb´Rs ´ 1q,
where FγEp¨q is given in (8).
Let us introduce an example of Lemmas 1 and 2. Fig. 2 illustrates the performance of the
success probability (psuc) and secrecy outage probability (pso) as a function of the transmission
rate Rb. As expected, the performance improves by increasing the number of antennas either
at the legitimate link or at the Eve. However, Eve can only change its own diversity, and thus
outage probability (we recall that higher secrecy outage, means that more information is acquired
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by the eavesdropper), by adding more antennas, since it cannot exploit diversity from Alice’s
antennas. In its turn, the legitimate channel performance enhances even more if the aggregator
dedicates more antennas to reception. Additionally, notice that we assume a multiple antenna
scenario, encompassing the single antenna case introduced in [19].
After presenting Lemmas 1 and 2, we are able to define the secure throughput and the
maximization problem.
Definition 1 (Secure throughput). The secure throughput Ts of the legitimate link (between smart
meter and aggregator) is defined as
Ts
4“ Rs psuc “ Rs
˜
1´ P
ˆ
NB ,
µ
γB
˙NA¸
. (9)
With respect to Alice, our goal is to determine the best transmission rate that ensures both
reliability and secrecy. This thus maximizes the secure throughput to Bob, while respecting
secrecy outage (psopRb, Rsq ď ) and QoS constrains (psucpµq ě σ). Then, we can define the
following maximization problem as
argmax
Rs,Rb,µ
Ts
subject to psopRb, Rsq ď 
psucpµq ě σ
µ ě 2Rb ´ 1
Rs ą 0,
(10)
where 0 ď σ ď 1 is the minimum acceptable success probability, reflecting the QoS constraint
on the legitimate channel, and 0 ď  ď 1 is the maximum acceptable information leakage.
Note that Alice is aware that eavesdropping may occur, and thus protects its transmission by
optimally selecting a proper rate while minimizing the secrecy outage. We will further discuss the
impact of these assumptions in Section IV. From (20) and Lemma 2, we can see that psopRb, Rsq
is independent of µ. Thereby, we first maximize psucpµq, which is monotonically decreasing with
respect to µ, by minimizing µ. Hence, its optimal value is µ “ 2Rb ´ 1.
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Proposition 1. Assuming optimal µ “ 2Rb´1, the transmission rate Rb that ensures psucpµq ě σ
is
Rb ď log2
˜
1` γB α log
˜ˆ
1´ p1´ σq
1
NANB
˙´1¸¸
, (11)
where α “ ΓpNB ` 1q
1
NB .
Proof: From Lemma 1 we have psucpµq and then under the constraint σ, we attain
1´ P
´
NB ,
µ
γB
¯NA ě σ (12)
P
´
NB ,
µ
γB
¯ paqď p1´ σq 1NA (13)ˆ
1´ exp
ˆ
´ µ
γB α
˙˙NB pbqď p1´ σq 1NA (14)
µ
pcqď γB α log
`
ξ´1
˘
, (15)
paq since 0 ď σ ď 1 we isolate the regularized gamma function, which is invertible only for
the equality, thus µ “ γB P´1
ˆ
NB , p1´ σq
1
NA
˙
, where P´1pa, xq is the inverse of the
generalized regularized incomplete gamma function defined in [24], [25]; otherwise,
pbq since NB ą 0 µγB ą 0, we rewrite paq by resorting to the following inequality p1 ´
expp´αaxqqa ď Ppa, xq, where αa “ Γp1 ` aq1{a (equality holds for a “ 1) [26, Ch8,
§8.10.11],
pcq last, since all variables are positive we isolate the variable µ, where ξ “
ˆ
1´ p1´ σq
1
NANB
˙
Finally, we know that µ “ 2Rb ´ 1, thus we readily attain (11).
Corollary 1. Assuming NA P Z˚ and NB “ 1, which is the case when only TAS is employed at
the legitimate channel, then Rb ď log2
ˆ
1` γB log
ˆ´
1´ p1´ σq 1NA
¯´1˙˙
. While for NA “
NB “ 1 (single antenna case), (11) reduces to Rb ď log2 p1` γB log pσ´1qq as in [19].
Next, we tackle the restriction on the information leakage psopRb, Rsq ď .
Proposition 2. For any Rb ą Rs the secrecy outage is monotonically decreasing with Rb, while
monotonically increasing with respect to Rs. Thus, satisfying psopRb, Rsq ď , the throughput
12
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Fig. 3. Illustrative example of the trade-off between reliability and security for distinct sets of antennas, from the single (left)
to multiple (right) antennas. Contour plots indicate the value of .4 ď σ ď 0.99 as a function of the relative gain between the
average SNR of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels, namely ρ “ γB
γE
, and .
maximizing Rs is
Rs “ Rb ´ log2
`
1` γE P´1 pNE , 1´ q
˘
, (16)
where P´1pa, xq is the inverse of the generalized regularized incomplete gamma function [24]1.
Proof: Since for any Rb ą Rs the secrecy outage is a decreasing function of Rb, the
maximizing throughput Rs occurs when psopRb, Rsq “ . In the equality Ppa, zq “ x is invertible
[24], which allow us to isolate z “ 2Rb´Rs ´ 1 and then attain Rs as in (16).
We are about to state the simplified version of our maximization problem given Propositions
1 and 2 discussed above. But first, let us introduce an important result that allows us to assess
the trade-off between reliability and security.
Proposition 3. Given a positive secrecy rate Rs ą 0, we establish the trade-off between reliability
1It is noteworthy that P´1pa, xq is an analytic function of a and x and can be easily evaluated through standard mathematical
frameworks such as Mathematica [24] as well as SciPy [25].
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and security as
σ ă 1´
ˆ
1´ exp
ˆ
´P
´1 pNE, 1´ q
ρα
˙˙NANB
, (17)
where ρ 4“ γB{γE defines the relative gain between the average SNR of the legitimate (γB) and
eavesdropper (γE) channels.
Proof: In order to achieve a positive secrecy rate Rs ą 0, we have to guarantee that
Rb ą log2
`
1` γE P´1 pNE , 1´ q
˘
. From (11) we attain Rb, and then we isolate σ as follows
´γBα log
ˆ
1´ p1´ σq
1
NANB
˙
ą γE P´1 pNE , 1´ q (18)
log
ˆ
1´ p1´ σq
1
NANB
˙
paqă P
´1 pNE , 1´ q
ρα
, (19)
paq since 0 ď  ď 1, NA ą 0, NB ą 0, we isolate the function of σ in the right-side and then
define ρ; then
since all variables are positive and grater than zero, we perform some algebraic manipulations
and isolate σ as in (17).
Corollary 2. Assuming NA P Z˚ and NB “ 1, then σ ă 1´
`
1´ exp `´P´1 pNE, 1´ q {ρ˘˘NA ,
whilst for the single antenna case, (11) reduces to σ ă 1{ρ, which was also attained in [19].
Fig. 3 illustrates the trade-off between reliability and security stated in Proposition 3. We
evaluate σ, which can be seen as a QoS/reliability indicator, as a function of , which denotes
how much secrecy outage the system tolerates, as well as ρ, which captures how good is the
main channel with respect to the eavesdropper’s channel. Fig. 3 has four settings: from single
to multi antenna configuration.
For instance, if Alice employs only TAS (NA “ 4), Bob and Eve are single antenna, there is
a great gain in reliability with respect to the single antenna case, in fact, reliability grows from
60% to about 97.5% for  “ .2 and ρ “ 5 dB. However, as NE increases the feasibility region
diminishes. For instance, if Eve has one more antenna, thus NE “ 2, σ drops from 97.5% to
about 86%. This effect can be counteracted by adding more antennas to the legitimate link, thus
enhancing reliability through diversity. This case is exemplified on the rightmost plot of Fig. 3,
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where Bob now has NB “ 2 antennas, which renders more than 99% of reliability for  ą 0.1
and ρ ą 5 dB.
In this discussion we set  “ 0.2, which is somewhat a high value for secrecy constraints. As we
shall discuss in the next section, such high secrecy outage constraint may be feasible (acceptable)
depending on the application. Of course, the less information lost the better, especially if the
information is critical. We recall that herein we are only evaluating security at PHY layer as a
way to complement some cryptographic method implemented in the higher layers of the protocol
stack. Nonetheless, our results also show ways to increase security at PHY layer, thus smaller
values of , by increasing the number of antennas as well as guaranteeing high SNR at the main
link (larger ρ).
Finally, one more way to increase performance of the legitimate link is to maximize the secure
throughput, which is hereby our goal and we are now ready to state the simplified version of our
maximization problem given Propositions 1 to 3. Therefore, the secure throughput maximization
problem is rewritten as,
argmax
Rb
Ts “ pRb ´Req
˜
1´ P
ˆ
NB ,
2Rb ´ 1
γB
˙NA¸
subject to Re ă Rb
(20)
where Rb is given in (11) from Proposition 1, and Re “ log2
`
1` γE P´1 pNE , 1´ q
˘
comes
from Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. The optimal secure throughput of our proposed scheme is given as
T ˚s “ pR˚b ´Req
¨˝
1´ P
˜
NB ,
2R
˚
b ´ 1
γB
¸NA‚˛, (21)
where the optimal transmission rate Rb˚ is the solution for the following transcendental equation
1´ P pNB , yqNA“βyNB´1e´y P pNB , yqNA´1 , (22)
where y “ 2Rb´1
γB
given the domain Re ă Rb and respecting the condition (17), where β “
logp2qNApRb´Req2Rb
ΓpNBqγB .
Proof: The function Ts is continuous and concave in the domain Re ă Rb (with NA, NB P Z˚
and γB ą 0), where Rb is given in (11), since its second derivative with respect to Rb is negative,
15
thus B2Ts{BR2b ă 0, therefore Rb˚ is attained by solving the first derivative of Ts with respect to
Rb and equating to zero, BTs{BRb “ 0, which after some algebraic manipulations yields (22).
Unfortunately, (22) does not have a closed-form expression, though it is noteworthy that (22)
can be easily evaluated numerically using mathematical frameworks such as Mathematica and
SciPy [27]. For the single antenna case an closed-from expression for Rb˚ can be attained as in
[19].
We illustrate Proposition 4 with the following numerical example depicted in Fig. 4, where
secure throughput is evaluated as a function of the SNR of the legitimate link γB, assuming
γE “ 0 dB (thus ρ “ γB), σ “ 95% for NA “ 4, NB P t1, 4u and NE “ 2. As expected, by
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Fig. 5. Secure throughput as a function of the σ on the left and  on the right, for fixed γB “ 10 dB, assuming γE “ 0 dB,
and distinct antenna configurations.
relaxing the constraint on the secrecy outage , larger throughput can achieved. Similar effect
can be also observed if we relax the QoS constraint (σ). An significant improvement can be
observed as the number of antennas at the legitimate channel grows.
Fig. 5 further shows the secure throughput as a function of the legitimate link QoS (σ) on the
left, and as a function of the secrecy outage threshold () on the right. We assume ρ “ 10 dB
and distinct antenna configurations. Again, the higher the number of antennas at the legitimate
link, greater throughput is achieved, for instance by increasing by one the number of antennas
at Bob the throughput more than doubles (ˆ2.33) for  “ .10 and σ “ .90.
Such throughput enhancement can be also observed by relaxing the constraint on the secrecy
outage. Interestingly, some performance floors are achieved with respect to our constraints. For
instance, from Fig. 5 on the right, the QoS constraint can be relaxed from 98% to 90% and yet
the same throughput is achieved even having more antennas available at the legitimate channel,
which is consequence of Proposition 3.
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All in all, our results show the trade-off between security and reliability, and thus depending
on the application more relaxed secrecy constraints can ensure great reliability. Likewise, we are
also able to trade reliability for secrecy, which in this case goes against current standards for
smart grids that requires at least 98% reliability in the communication link [1]. Nonetheless, [1]
do not account for security and herein we show that such constraint can be achieved and even
higher security can be guaranteed if the reliability constraint is relaxed.
In the following section, we illustrate our framework with a practical smart grid example. As
we will see later, the information to be transmitted is average power demand of a household
where the aggregator and the eavesdropper need to reconstruct the load profile curve.
IV. SECURE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AVERAGE POWER DEMAND CURVE
In the previous section, we commented that if we allow a larger secrecy outage, higher
throughput in the legitimate link can be attained. Consequently, larger secrecy outage means
that the Eve will decode more information and become more knowledgeable about our system.
However, as we discuss next, even in this case Eve will not be able to acquire enough information
to reconstruct the average power demand curve completely.
Let us first exemplify how Alice transmits its average power demand to Bob. Then, let xrns
denote the average power demand, where n “ 1, ..., N is the index and N total number of
samples. Transmissions are schedule in fixed period of time τ , herein we assume 15-minute
based sampling and a transmission and thus τ “ 0.25 hour, which renders N “ 96 samples
per day. If an outage occurs, Bob reconstructs the signal via linear interpolation between two
adjacent points. Thus, Bob will interpolate the missing value(s) using the latest two received
samples. Similarly, we assume that Eve also attempts to estimate and reconstruct the signal via
linear interpolation. For example, consider the transmitted sequence: xrk´2s, xrk´1s, xrks with
k “ 2, ..., N , and let yrks denote the received signal, k “ 1, ..., N . Then, if the samples xrk´ 2s
and xrks are successfully received but xrk ´ 1s is not, the reconstruction is based on the linear
interpolation and the estimated point is denoted by yrk ´ 1s “ pyrks ` yrk ´ 2sq{2.
In order to perform our analysis we resort to “The Reference Energy Disaggregation Data Set”
(REDD) database [28], [29] to build the signal xrns, which is a 15-minute average power demand
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Fig. 6. Examples of average power demand curves for three distinct houses from REDD database over 24 hours with
transmissions every 15 minutes. House 1 presents a low power demand (few appliances (e.g. fridge) are on), House 2 has
higher average and presents peak demand, which is also observed in House 3. The cases where the eavesdropper acquires 10%
and 20% of the packages if also depicted.
over a timespan of 24 hours2. We assume that both Bob and Eve use linear interpolation to
reconstruct the power demand curve. In order to estimate the error due to the signal reconstruction
2The REDD database is composed of 6 households, monitored during several days with a frequency of 1Hz. After processing
the data (namely, the sum of the power of phases A and B), we identified 53 slices of 24-hour periods (all aligned in time
among themselves) which provide us a full set of average power measures. In other words, each of these slices can be seen as
a single household and then these measures are used to simulate the daily transmissions
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we adopt the root mean square deviation (RMSD), which is calculated based on the received
(and estimated when needed) samples and the actual data, and is given as
RMSD “
gffe 1
N
Nÿ
k“1
pyrks ´ xrksq2. (23)
In order to facilitate the comparison among household power demand profiles, we choose to
normalize the RMSD (NRMSD) by the average of the transmitted signal power, thus NRMSD “
RMSD{y, which is commonly known as the coefficient of variation of the RMSD.
Further, from the database selected 3 households that provide a significant representation of
the dataset, namely House 1, House 2 and House 3, since each of these households presents a
distinct average power demand profile. Fig. 6 exemplifies the average power demand of these
three distinct houses over 24 hours with transmissions every 15 minutes. For instance, House 1
presents a low power demand profile, which means that few appliances are on (e.g. fridge,
lights). House 2 has higher average compared to House 1 and presents peak demand, which is
also observed in House 3. For instance, from the data of House 2 we can infer that there is more
activity in the house in early morning (e.g. showering, preparing breakfast) and at the end of the
day, around the time where people are having dinner, doing the house chores, and watching TV.
House 3 has similar patterns, but shifted in time and concentrated during the afternoon. Fig. 6
also assumes that an eavesdropper is able to decode 10% (red square) or 20% (blue circle) of the
packages, due to the secrecy outages occurred in this period. Note that if Eve can obtain 20%
of the packets, she is still not able to reconstruct the power demand curve and then infer the
presence and activities within a given house. On the other hand, with σ ě 90% few points are lost
such that the aggregator can estimate them through linear interpolation without larger estimations
errors. It is noteworthy that a malicious eavesdropper may acquire this information and perform
a series of cyber (and even physical) attacks on a neighborhood by exploiting the smart meters
transmissions. Given enough intercepted points, it is possible to infer personal information and
inhabitants behavior and activities (for instance, presence and absence hours, sleeping hours)
from the power demand curve [2]. Thus the necessity of protecting the transmission against
eavesdropping and any other type information leakage.
Fig. 7 depicts the normalized RMSD as a function of the outages, which represents the outage
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Fig. 7. Normalized RMSD as a function of the outage, which encompass reliability and secrecy outages. Note that σ (blue
line on the left) and 1´  (dashed red line on the right) thresholds delimit the regions that guarantee secrecy and reliability.
either at the legitimate link or information leakage to Eve. In terms of reliability, the region of
interest lies on the left-hand side of the plot and it is delimited by the σ threshold (blue line). We
assume Monte Carlo simulations with 105 repetitions for each house (each house has N “ 96
samples). After the linear interpolation used to estimate the missing points, we calculate the
RMSD and then normalize by the average power. As we can observe from the figure, if during
a day the legitimate link perceives outages of up to σ “ 10%, the demand power curve can
be reconstructed with low error. For instance, for σ “ 10%, the normalized RMSD for each
house is respectively 0.12, 0.18 and 0.35, and these values can be seen as coefficient of variation
indicating that there is a low variance in the reconstruction of the power demand curve. Eve,
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on the other hand, has a greater outage, which increases the error in the signal reconstruction
leading to high coefficient of variation. For example, secrecy outages of at most  ď 20% (which
means that, on average, Eve intercepts up to 20% of the transmissions) correspond to outages
greater than 80% and therefore a higher coefficient of variation of the RMSD as indicated by red
line (1´  threshold) on the rightmost side of Fig. 7. Notice that Eve acquires few points, and
thus her estimation and reconstruction is very poor, as a result of Alices strategy when setting
the secrecy outage threshold and optimizing the secure throughput. It is worth mentioning that
the reduction on the normalized RMSD on the extreme right (more than 97% of outages) occurs
because the number of points available at Eve is small. In this cases the RMSD is calculated
with respect to zero or to a line that lies close to average of the actual signal, which decreases
the RMSD. To illustrate this point assume that Eve only attained a point around hours 3 and 21
from House 3, as depicted in Fig. 6. Based only on that, Eve estimates that all points lie within
this line, and as we can see from Fig. 6 the majority of the points is closer to the marginal
power demand rather than to the peak consumption hours.
V. DISCUSSIONS
We proposed a physical layer security scheme that enhances the communication link between
a pair of legitimate nodes in the presence of an eavesdropper. In our scenario, an eavesdropper
may attempt to acquire information from the smart meters from a given neighborhood. However,
the transmitter does not have any CSI from the Eve, but is still able to optimize its transmission
rate such that secure throughput can be achieved. Notice that the results attained herein are not
limited to smart grid applications, thus we provide an general framework that can be extended
to other contexts. In the previous sections we have discussed how we can improve the secure
throughput, reliability and security of the system and we connect our analytical results with
actual data and signal reconstruction. Herein, we discuss some pros and cons of this proposed
method and future work.
A. Reliability and secrecy outage constraints
We set the reliability constraint (σ) to ensure a minimum robustness for the legitimate link.
Likewise, the secrecy outage constraint () envisages a maximum information leakage to the
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eavesdropper. Then, we present the trade-off between security and reliability, in which we can
choose to sacrifice robustness of the legitimate link for security, or relax the secrecy constraint
in order to achieve higher reliability. Current standards foresee a reliability greater than 98%
for the communication link in the smart grid (smart meter–aggregator) [1]. As discussed above,
such constraint is stringent especially if we want add security at physical layer while enhancing
the performance of the system.
Then, how big would be the sacrifice of robustness of the legitimate link for security? A
more appropriate answer can be given only if we know the information that is sent to the
aggregator, so that different information flows have distinct priorities and allocation. In our case,
we assume that the information sent is the average power demand, then we show that the signal
reconstruction is possible even with relatively loose outage constraints (e.g. σ ě 90%), while
Eve cannot attain much information at secrecy outages of  ď 10%. Notice that this result is
dependent on the inherent characteristic of the transmitted signal, for instance, as we can observe
from Fig. 6 the average power demand presents overall low variation around the average (see
House 1), except for relatively short periods of peak consumption as in House 2 and House 3.
Therefore, design the whole system for higher outage probabilities in the legitimate link as well
as high secrecy outages may not be prudent for other kind of signals or if the aggregator should
provide some kind of feedback to the smart meter (e.g. change the power demand behavior, as in
strategies of demand-side management [22]). Thus, the necessity of classifying the information
flows from smart meters to aggregator with respect to signal characteristics, as well as reliability
and security.
B. Enhancing robustness of the legitimate link
Herein, we assume that transmissions are scheduled every 15 minutes, and if a package does
not meet our outage constraint, it is considered lost and then Bob will estimate the power demand
via interpolation. Alternatively, as future work, another scenario may include Hybrid Automatic
Repeat Request (HARQ) strategies in order to enhance the communication link, which reduces
outage events while enhancing throughput as show in [30], [31]. Cooperation may also be an
extension to enhance secure throughput and reliability [13], [14]. Thus, these more advanced
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communication techniques combined may be used to enhance secure throughput and would be
an interesting next step for the present work.
C. Signal processing and transmission
Fig. 6 exemplifies a 15 minute sampling interval of the power demand of a household. Due to
the characteristics of this signal, a time-based sampling might not be the most effective way to
collect and sent data to the aggregator. Then, as pointed out in [32] event based sampling may be
more suitable, once it reduces the amount of redundant information transmitted. However, such
approach requires a more robust communication link, due to the lack of redundant data, and
therefore the loss of any sample will have a more dramatic effect on the signal reconstruction. At
the same time, this scheme is more secure once Eve acquires even less information. As pointed
out in [33] transmission strategies and outage constraints should be evaluated in combination
with the sampling procedure, due to the amount of redundant information generated in each
case.
It is worth noting that even though we analyze the situation for a 24-hour period and a simple
interpolation technique. Due to the daily habits of the dwellers, it would be possible to recover
the usage profile (or activities) by superimposing the missing data from one day with data from
similar days. However, this would require more sophisticated signal processing at Eve as well
as large time window that could range from days to months depending on the settings of the
network. Such process is also hampered by slight variations in the habits and activities of the
inhabitants if we consider a sufficiently high outage for Eve.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
Herein we assess the secure communication link between smart-meters and an aggregator in
the presence of a potential eavesdropper (Eve). We assume MIMOME wiretap channel, where
Alice employs transmit antenna selection and has no channel state information of Bob and Eve.
Therefore, we resort to fixed Wyner codes and then optimize Alice’s transmission rate so that
secure throughput can be guaranteed subject to quality of service and secrecy outage constraints.
We assess in closed-form both secrecy outage and successful transmission probabilities, and then
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maximize the secure throughput and establish the secrecy-reliability trade-off. Our numerical
results illustrate the effect of this trade-off on the secure throughput as well as number of
antennas at Alice, Bob and Eve. Our results show that a small sacrifice in reliability allows
secrecy enhancement. Even though Eve may acquire some information, we show that it will not
be enough to reconstruct the average power demand curve of a household.
We plan to study in future works how the secure throughput will be affected under different
sampling strategies. In this way, we plan to build a joint sampling-transmission technique that
can improve the system efficiency, as discussed in Section V.
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